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I. INTRODUCTION
In Risks and Wrongs, Jules Coleman investigates what Aquinas called
"commutative justice"-the dimension of justice that arises from and governs
transactions between individuals.' Aquinas' term conveniently captures the
object of Coleman's inquiry because it brings concerns of justice in contracts
and in torts together under a single rubric, permitting an exploration of their
general similarities and specific differences.2
* John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale University.
t Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Department of Philosophy, The University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill; Ph.D., Comell University.
1. 37 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 87-101 (Thomas Gilby trans., Blackfriars 1975).
2. The term "commutative justice" also has the advantage over "corrective justice" of emphasizing the
interpersonal or transactional dimension of justice in this domain without begging substantive questions
about its focal aim.
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Coleman outlines and defends a distinctively liberal theory of commutative
justice. While he works squarely within the rational choice tradition,3 his work
follows no party line. Indeed, readers of Risks and Wrongs will be surprised
to find that, while Coleman embraces the basic principles of individual and
social rationality at the foundations of rational choice theory and the economic
analysis of law, he rejects the idea that the perfectly competitive market is the
paradigm of rational social interaction. Coleman's "rational choice liberalism"
focuses on forms of cooperation instead of institutional attempts to mimic
perfect competition. In his view, the market is central to liberal political and
legal theory not because it is paradigmatically rational or because it allocates
goods and evils most efficiently, but because it serves social stability and local
coordination of social interaction. This service enhances the ability of
individual citizens to live out their chosen plans and projects.
Having articulated and defended this revisionist rational choice political
theory, Coleman turns to the task of providing normative-interpretive theories
of commutative justice that embrace contract and tort law. He argues, first, that
contract law is best understood as safeguarding and enhancing market
transactions by helping parties to solve problems of uncertainty that are
endemic to the bargaining process. His interpretation of tort law, in contrast,
takes a decidedly "anti-market" approach. Tort law, he argues, seeks to secure
justice between parties by imposing the duty to compensate victims' wrongful
losses on the injurers; it is not designed to enhance market transactions. For
Coleman, the fundamental goal of tort law is not efficient accident-cost
avoidance, fair cost-spreading, or the annulment of wrongful losses; 4 rather, it
is corrective justice between the injurer and the victim. Although it is
"backward-looking," tort law can be justified within rational choice liberalism,
he maintains, because it sustains local coordination and promotes stability just
as the market does, albeit through strikingly different means. While this
decidedly "anti-market" account of tort law applies to the core of current
practice, Coleman argues that market-oriented principles already govern many
other parts of tort practice, and may even come to dominate it in the future.
Contemporary tort practice, he argues, is thus a mix of markets and morals.
This is only the barest sketch of Coleman's bold, richly colored, and subtly
nuanced theoretical picture. Coleman makes important contributions to each of
the theoretical areas he addresses, and his analysis has such a clarity of focus
that it should redefine contemporary debate in those areas. The signal virtue
of his work, however, is its inviting intellectual honesty and modesty. The
work has no fixed agenda. Coleman identifies and challenges opposing views,
but still makes room for many of them, newly revised, in his theoretical
3. The main theses of this tradition are discussed below. See infra Part II.A.
4. Coleman has argued for the annulment thesis for years, even as recently as 1992. See Jules L.
Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349 (1992).
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mansion. His analysis is guided by firm theoretical and substantive intuitions,
but he follows the argument where it leads him, sometimes even into untidy
complexity. No reader will find all of his arguments persuasive, but each will
come away from this work with a clear map of the theoretical terrain and a
firm sense of the interest and importance of Coleman's thesis.
In this Review, I discuss two important parts of Coleman's project. First,
I explore the foundation of Coleman's jurisprudential theory and his use of
rational choice theory as the basis for a liberal approach to moral and political
justification. Next, I focus on Coleman's interpretations of corrective justice
and modern tort practice, setting them out in some detail and trying to uncover
their deeper theoretical motivations.
II. RATIONAL CHOICE LIBERALISM
A. Rational Choice Theory and the Market Paradigm
In Risks and Wrongs, Coleman works self-consciously within that branch
of the liberal tradition that seeks to ground liberal institutions and fundamental
liberal values in a nonmoral notion of rational choice.5 Coleman's view is that
rational choice theory supplies the best available set of conceptual and
normative tools for articulating and defending liberal commitments. Moreover,
he maintains that it does so in a way that best captures and expresses liberal
commitments concerning the mode of justification appropriate to rational moral
agents and citizens.
Received rational choice theory proposes to justify moral, political, and
legal norms or institutions by showing that they meet the demands of
rationality defined in terms of individual interest. This interest-based notion of
rationality takes shape in two familiar principles: (a) a norm is collectively
rational if and only if it is Pareto optimal, enabling persons constrained by it
to exploit the full welfare-enhancing potential of their interaction; and (b) a
norm is individually rational for any agent governed by it if and only if it is
welfare-enhancing, or not welfare-decreasing, for that agent.6 A set of norms,
then, is rational in a group if and only if compliance with it is both Pareto
optimal and advantageous to each member. Satisfaction of each principle is
necessary to the justification of norms or institutions. Coleman adds to this
standard account of conditions of rationality a third principle, which explains
what he terms the "distributive" dimension of morality.7 Because rational
5. Coleman says that rational choice theory seeks a "nonnormative" foundation for moral and political
institutions, but the foundation is not outside all normative principle. Rather, he seeks "a grounding outside
of morality, yet within reason." JULEs L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 45 (1992) [hereinafter RiSKS AND
WRONGS]; see also id. at 47-48.
6. Id. at 18-21.
7. Id. at 22-26.
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choice theory stands outside the framework of moral notions and standards and
seeks to defend those standards in terms of rationality alone, it cannot appeal
to a notion of fair division. Instead, it must define a principle of divisional
rationality, according to which a scheme of constraint and cooperation is
rational only if the division of gains of productive cooperative activity is
determined by each party's relative resistance to making concessions to the
others.8
In Coleman's view, these three principles of rational choice represent the
demands of rationality on social norms and institutions, and offer a precise and
compelling interpretation of a fundamental principle of liberal political theory.
This liberal principle holds that norms or institutions that regulate individual
conduct or affect individual well-being are valid only if they can be justified
to each individual affected. Rational choice principles meet this liberal demand
in two respects: (a) they only recognize arguments that are articulated in terms
of promoting the interests of individuals, and (b) they require that the norm or
institution work to the advantage of each individual affected. The principle of
individual rationality thus represents a welfarist interpretation of the liberal
demand for ad hominem justification. 9
Coleman parts company with standard rational choice theorists when they
embrace what he calls "the market paradigm." The market paradigm holds that
the perfectly competitive market is the ideal institutional embodiment of the
above principles of rationality. ° Under conditions of perfect competition,
individual and collective rationality converge. The market paradigm assumes
that rational agents are not fundamentally interested in cooperation. According
to this view, cooperation is defensible or intelligible only if viewed as a
solution to failed competition.' Coleman challenges this assumption by
arguing that it is just as reasonable to regard competition as the result of failed
cooperation." Successful competition presupposes cooperative collective action,
he argues; indeed, competitive market activity-setting prices, bidding,
bargaining, and forming a stable set of preferences for a range of goods-is
intelligible only against a background of stable and enforceable property rights
and an ethos of mutual forbearance of force and fraud. These public goods are
8. In Chapter 5 of Risks and Wrongs, Coleman develops a "resistance-concession theory" of divisional
rationality. For this purpose the divisional problem is construed as a bargaining problem for parties wishing
to divide the benefits and burdens of cooperation. Coleman observes that bargainers will resist making
concessions to their counterparts in negotiation to a degree determined by three factors: (a) the cost of the
concession to them, (b) the cost of failing to achieve a cooperative agreement, and (c) their best hoped-for
outcome. In view of this, Coleman argues that a concession is rational for a bargainer if and only if that
bargainer's resistance, determined as a function of the three elements just mentioned, is less than or equal
to the resistance of everyone else. RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 4, at 114-15.
9. Id. at 29-30.
10. Id. at 17.
11. Id. at 42.
12. Id. at 60-61, 65.
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products of prior cooperative activity. 3 Thus, he concludes, rational choice
theory must treat cooperation rather than competition as the model of rational
social interaction.
In contrast to the agents posited by standard rational choice theory and its
market paradigm, Coleman's ideal agents are not merely rational utility
maximizers, but also rational cooperators.' 4  Coleman's rational choice
liberalism combines the three principles of rationality with his claim that, when
deciding upon the structure of social institutions, ideal rational choosers
consider cooperation, not competition, to be fundamental. They ask themselves:
Which norms, institutions, or modes of interaction best enable us to cooperate
rationally? This is not to say that they no longer face problems of defection or
that rational choosers are willing to sacrifice their own benefits for the
collective good. It means, rather, that they are searching for forms of
cooperative interaction that meet the conditions of productive (Pareto),
individual, and distributive rationality.
According to this view of the rational choosers' task, the market no longer
sets the standard of rationality for other forms of social interaction. Coleman's
rational choice liberalism regards markets, law, politics, and morality as
institutional forms of cooperation, and assesses their rationality in light of a
community's empirical circumstances and the institutions' assigned tasks.'
5
While markets still assume a large role in Coleman's liberal theory, he also
recognizes the importance and value of other forms of social cooperation. In
particular, he recognizes the importance of deliberative practices, through
which people collectively articulate social values and establish a common
identity.' 6 Such institutions as morality, law, and politics govern deliberative
practices, and Coleman argues that it would radically distort those institutions
to say that they serve or mimic the market. On the contrary, the political, legal,
and moral realms "exist at least in part to resolve disputes for which markets
are inappropriate and to articulate commitments markets are poorly suited to
express."' 7
13. Id. at 61.
14. Id. at 66. Coleman does not, however, make it sufficiently clear that this commitment to
cooperation, like the market paradigm's commitment to competition, is derivative, resting on the ideal
agents' prior commitment to the three principles of rationality.
15. Id. at 62-67.
16. Id. at 65.
17. Id. at 65. Coleman does not explicitly argue for deliberative practices, and the institutions that
shape them, as part of his rational choice liberalism. Presumably, he believes that just as rational
cooperators would recognize the instrumental value of markets, they would endorse deliberative practices
as rationally defensible forms of social cooperation. This argument should have been spelled out, however,
because it is not obvious that rational cooperators as Coleman describes them would endorse such practices.
One obstacle to their doing so is the fact that they seem capable of viewing problems of practical
deliberation and decision-making only from a first-person singular point of view, even though it is only
possible to appreciate the nature and value of these public deliberative practices from a first-person plural
point of view. See generally Gerald J. Postema, Public Practical Reason: An Archeology, SOC. PHIL. &
POL. (forthcoming 1995); Gerald J. Postema, Public Practical Reason: Political Practice, in THEORY AND
PRACTICE: NOMOS XXXVII (Ian Shapiro & Judith De Cew eds., forthcoming 1994).
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Thus, in Coleman's rational choice liberalism, legal institutions are
justified to the extent that they serve the interests and needs of rational
cooperators. In some cases, as in the law of contracts, law facilitates the small-
scale, local coordination of interaction typical of market transactions. In some
ways, then, rational choice liberalism vindicates economic theories of law. Yet
even here Coleman introduces a major shift in emphasis. In his view, the aim
of market protection is not to maximize efficiency or to ensure competition,
but to promote a form of social cooperation. He further argues that other areas
of the law, particularly constitutional law and tort law, are interpreted along
revisionist economic analysis lines only at the price of seriously distorting the
institutions. Constitutional law is better understood as an institutionalization of
collective deliberative practices, and modern tort law as a formal
implementation of corrective justice. While Coleman does not explicitly argue
for the former claim, he spends nearly half of Risks and Wrongs defending the
latter. Before I turn my attention to his account of tort law, however, I want
to consider briefly Coleman's argument for the market as a rational form of
social cooperation, which illustrates how he hopes to put the general
framework of rational choice liberalism to work in normative political and
legal theory.
B. Markets in Liberal Political Culture
The rational choice school defends the market either as the purest
expression of rationality or as the best institutional means for achieving
efficient allocation of goods. The market has also been justified on more
explicitly liberal grounds as giving the fullest scope to individual choice in
contexts of social interaction, thereby enhancing individual liberty. Although
Coleman explicitly rejects the argument that markets embody perfectly rational
interaction, he does not explicitly reject the other two arguments. 8
Coleman chooses to defend the market as a form of cooperative social
organization. Its most important feature, he argues, is that it enables people
living in communities "whose values and population are dispersed" to interact
for mutual advantage with only minimal agreement regarding matters of
value.' 9 Successful cooperation in a market is possible without a common
conception of the good life or even the value of the goods in question. In
small, homogeneous communities, rational cooperators are not likely to find
this feature of markets especially valuable. Large, geographically dispersed
communities, on the other hand, are characterized by a diversity of traditions
and values, so the minimal valuational demands of the market would appear
especially attractive to members seeking rational forms of social cooperation.
18. RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 4, at 67.
19. Id. at 68.
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Coleman argues that under the latter set of historical social conditions, which
are characteristic of "liberal political cultures," markets promote stability.2"
Members of such societies can engage in social intercourse civilly and to their
mutual advantage without needing to articulate and resolve their disagreements.
Such stability is important, Coleman maintains, because it is a prerequisite of
political freedom.2' Individual freedom and "human autonomy" require a wide
range of possible ways of life, and hence a society characterized by "value
pluralism," as well as a stable framework of social institutions "within which
individuals can construct and pursue their projects, plans, and goals."' 2 The
market promotes stability in a way especially well suited to individual
autonomy because it works its integrating magic without threatening "value
pluralism" in the community. Thus, Coleman believes, the market's singular
capacity to serve rational cooperators' need for stable forms of cooperation
under modem conditions of pluralism recommends the market to liberals.
This argument is remarkable in several respects. It views the market as a
social institution, as an institutionalized form of social interaction within the
pale of moral and political assessment, and thus differs sharply from the
assumption that the market is either an ideal construct or a "natural" form of
human interaction outside the pale of morality.23 Coleman's argument also
recognizes that the value of a social institution is likely to vary with social
conditions. It assumes that we can assess the value of the market only in
certain social and cultural contexts. These are lessons not easily learned in the
school of rational choice theory.
The above argument illustrates well how Coleman's rational choice
liberalism approaches the task of justifying a given norm or institution. But the
argument is incomplete as it stands and, I suspect, more limited in scope than
Coleman acknowledges. He seems to argue that rational cooperators would
accord markets a wide scope in liberal political cultures because markets
promote stability and thus facilitate autonomy. That argument is incomplete,
however, because Coleman never shows why rational cooperators would value
autonomy. To do so he must show that all rational cooperators have an
intrinsic or derivative interest in autonomy and that markets promote autonomy
in a way that best serves their interests overall. In view of the wide range of
interests rational cooperators are likely to have, and the different weights they
are likely to give the interests they share, it would be difficult to make a
convincing interest-based argument for autonomy.
24
20. Id. at 436.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 436, 439.
23. According to David Gauthier, the market represents a "morally free zone." DAVID GAUTHIER,
MORALS BY AGREEMENT 13-14, 95-100 (1986).
24. For a discussion of the difficulties of interest-based arguments for liberty, see Ronald Dworkin,
What Is Equality? Part III: The Place of Liberty, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1, 13-22 (1987).
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Coleman also argues that in a society marked by a dispersion of values
and population, markets promote stability by enabling members to interact
without requiring prior agreement on substantive values. However, he
underestimates the cultural resources necessary to deploy successfully the
market. The market can promote stability and cooperative interaction only if
a culture believes it appropriate that the public value and allocation of goods
be determined by factors other than the intrinsic merit of the goods. The
culture must regard the goods and associated relationships as properly
disengaged from deeper moral and evaluative convictions in society. In other
words, the market will be able to work its magic only in a culture that is
"liberal" in its diversity of evaluative visions, in the geographical dispersion
of its population, and in its response to that diversity and dispersion. The
viability of markets presupposes a certain, characteristically liberal, collective
response to pluralism.
Consider two salient features of the market as social institution. First, as
the debate over surrogate mother contracts reveals, the market is not merely
a mode of interaction, but is also an institutionalized form of social valuation.
If a community decides that a good is properly traded on the market, it takes
a stand concerning the public value of that good. It holds that the value of that
good lies in its ability to satisfy individual preferences, and can be measured
against that of other goods traded on the market. Two features of this form of
valuation are of immediate interest: the value of the commodity lies wholly in
its satisfaction of arbitrary individual preferences, rendering pointless any
deliberative reflection on the reasons for so valuing the commodity; and the
social valuation of the commodity is strictly a vector sum of individual
valuations, leaving no room for common or collective valuation.'
Second, like any social interaction, successful market interaction depends
heavily on compliance with rules against the use of force and fraud, and, more
deeply, on a climate of trust. Trust springs from and depends upon a variety
of social conditions. In many historical communities, the climate of trust
depended heavily on widely shared sets of moral values or religious
convictions. A climate of trust may also rest on a much thinner basis, however,
depending far less on reassurances of the other party's orthodoxy. The basis
of trust in a community is both a condition and consequence of a collective
response to moral heterogeneity and cultural diversity.
Because of the above-mentioned features of markets as social institutions,
markets will promote stability in a society marked by moral and evaluative
pluralism only if the dominant culture inspires trust without substantive
agreement of moral vision and permits the social valuation of market goods
25. I do not mean to say that all preferences expressed in market behavior are arbitrary. My point is
that the market is indifferent to whether preferences are arbitrary or reflectively grounded, whether they
are mere preferences or preferences based on evaluative judgments.
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and relationships to be disengaged from deeper, common sources of evaluation.
Where morally pluralistic communities determine the social value of such
goods and relationships on a substantive, reflective, deliberative, or collective
basis, the introduction of markets for such goods will more likely produce
instability. Similarly, markets cannot function properly in a culture that has
responded in a less than liberal manner to its diversity of moral and evaluative
convictions. Thus, rather than saying that markets promote social stability in
circumstances of diversity and moral pluralism, it is perhaps more accurate to
say that the scope and importance of markets in a society reflect the extent to
which liberal culture exists in a society.
26
Before concluding this discussion of Coleman's foundational political
theory, I will briefly consider Coleman's attempt to locate tort law and
corrective justice in rational choice liberalism. Coleman's argument that
corrective justice and its implementation in tort law would be valuable to
rational cooperators parallels his argument for the market.2 7 Again, he rests his
argument not on the intrinsic value of redressing wrongful losses, but on the
instrumental value of the practice. Coleman claims that the practice sustains
local conventions of behavior in a community, conventions that determine the
expectations and actions of its members.2" Thus, corrective justice and tort law
promote cooperation and stability, which, as we have seen, are valued because
they facilitate individual autonomy.
2 9
Coleman's argument for the value of corrective justice and tort law is not
as persuasive as his argument for the market. Coleman points out specific
features of the market that promote stability without threatening value
pluralism, but there seem to be no such protections built into the local
conventions sustained by corrective justice. Indeed, local conventions defining
reasonable risk-taking may work against the diversity of life pursuits in some
communities. Coleman may be correct that stability of expectations is a
necessary element of autonomy, but it is certainly not sufficient, and its costs,
measured in terms of restrictions on liberty, may be high. Without further
argument, we cannot be sure that rational cooperators living in a heterogeneous
society would choose such a form of stability-preserving cooperation.
Coleman suggests that, in addition to promoting stability, corrective justice
requires individuals to assume responsibility for the consequences of their
actions. Also, he notes that compensatory damage awards redistribute resources
26. This is, of course, not the only possible liberal response to heterogeneity and diversity. Liberals
may prefer to give wider scope to truly democratic deliberative institutions. Yet, in view of the high
personal and social costs of participation in those institutions, a reasonable husbanding of social and
personal resources will continue to make markets attractive to liberals across a wide range of social
interactions.
27. RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 4, at 359-60, 437-38.
28. Id. at 358-59.
29. Id. at 437.
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to victims, enhancing their ability to pursue their own plans and projects.30
Coleman maintains that these features of corrective justice further underscore
"the interplay between stability and autonomy at the heart of the overarching
liberal political theory that informs all our private law practices.' 31 This is a
plausible claim to the extent that the above-mentioned features of corrective
justice are likely to be attractive to liberals. The question, however, is whether
this "interplay" is at the heart of Coleman's rational choice political theory. To
prove that it is, Coleman would have to show that all rational cooperators have
an interest in autonomy as conceived by liberals, that their interest in
autonomy is best served by the institutions of commutative justice, and that
serving autonomy in this way best serves their interests overall. Until Coleman
further establishes the truth of these three claims, and the parallel claims for
the market, he will not have successfully grounded liberal political and legal
theory in his revised rational choice theory.
III. TORT LAW: MORAL CORE AND MARKET PENUMBRA
A. Interpreting Tort Practice
Coleman seeks to develop a normative interpretation of modern tort law.
His interpretation begins with the defeasible assumptions that tort practice
provides its participants with genuine reasons for action; and that its norms
define genuine responsibilities, rights, and duties. The interpretive task is to
present an account of this normative dimension that can "withstand the test of
rational reflection. ' 32 Success is measured by the degree to which the
normative interpretation accounts for the important elements of tort practice,
and by the degree to which its principles meet reflective critical approval.
Coleman takes a "top-down" approach to the interpretation of contract law.
He derives its fundamental principles from more abstract theoretical principles
of bargaining and rational choice and attempts to show that these principles
best explain the standard practice of contract law. In contrast, his interpretive
approach to tort law is better described as "middle-up. '33 Coleman's primary
aim is to develop an intuitively compelling account of tort practice. While he
makes some effort to link his account to rational choice liberalism, he does not
30. Id. at 437-38. This argument is somewhat obscure, but Coleman introduces it in response to an
initiative from economic theory of torts that proposes replacing conventional lump-sum damage awards with
packages of specific-service contracts designed to meet victims' accident-related needs. Coleman's objection
resembles anti-paternalist objections to in-kind social services.
31. Id. at 439. Strangely, while Coleman is unwilling to rest his argument for the market on its
autonomy-serving virtues alone, id. at 67, he does not hesitate to do so when it comes to corrective justice
practices, id. at 437.
32. Id. at 7.
33. Id. at 8-9.
34. Id. at 478-80 n.l.
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attempt to derive principles of tort law from his political theory.35 Indeed, he
admits that if we were to approach this part of commutative justice from the
lofty perspective of rational choice liberalism, we would "miss much that is
important about the practice.' 36 This is not to say that rational choice
liberalism cannot ultimately explain the rational appeal of corrective justice and
its implementation in tort law, but rather that distinctive and rationally
attractive features of tort practice would be obscured if we were to approach
it "top-down."
Coleman's central thesis is that modem tort law gives legal expression to
our informal social practice of corrective justice. Thus, his project has four
phases: articulating the principles of corrective justice, demonstrating that they
explain modem tort law, showing that the principles are rationally defensible,
and proving that the legal institutionalization of these principles is
legitimate.37 While he pays some attention to the latter two tasks, Coleman
devotes the bulk of Part III of Risks and Wrongs to the first two.
According to Coleman, no single principle, whether economic or moral,
can adequately account for the widely divergent components of tort practice
without distorting essential elements of the practice or dismissing large
portions of the practice as mistakes. He thus proposes the hybrid theory that
tort law serves two masters at once.38 The "core" of tort law implements the
moral concerns of corrective justice, while its "penumbra" serves the market.
Coleman maintains that "the core of tort law is a certain practice of holding
people liable for the wrongful losses their conduct has occasioned., 39 This
underlying practice structures tort litigation and supplies its basic goal.
Coleman notes:
The structural feature is that in the typical case decisions about who
should bear a loss are rendered within a framework restricted to
victims and those individuals they identify as their injurers .... The
substantive feature is that if a victim can show that her loss is
wrongful in the appropriate sense, the burden of making good her loss
falls to the individual responsible for it.40
Standard rules concerning intentional and unintentional torts fall in the core,
he believes, while no-fault schemes, enterprise liability doctrines, worker's
compensation, and much of product liability litigation fall in the penumbra of
tort law. In the "penumbral" cases, "individuals are compensated for losses that
are not wrongful," or parties are required to repair losses even when they are
35. Id. at 359-60, 437-39.
36. Id. at 12.
37. For a discussion of the problems inherent in the fourth phase, see id. at 362, 490-91 n.l.
38. Id. at 303, 428 (describing tort law as a "mixture of markets and morals").
39. Id. at 198.
40. Id.
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not responsible for them in any ordinary sense.4' Principles of corrective justice
govern the core, whereas the penumbral cases are unified under market
principles.
It is tempting to conclude that this hybrid interpretation belies an
incoherent practice, but Coleman strongly defends the overall coherence of tort
practice. He believes that the two masters of tort law are markedly free of
normative jealousy and ambition. Principles of corrective justice, as Coleman
understands them, are not morally mandatory in the sense that a society would
be guilty of injustice if it failed to give them formal legal expression.42
Moreover, if the practice of corrective justice and the market are regarded as
alternative forms of social cooperation, then we might regard market-oriented
approaches to modem tort law and corrective justice practices as simply
alternate routes to the same ultimate goal of social stability.43 According to
Coleman, then, a market-oriented approach may be as morally legitimate as a
corrective justice approach, and can legitimately supplement, or even supplant,
corrective justice.
Essential to Coleman's interpretation of tort practice is his critique of
economic theories of torts. However, he believes his critique calls for a
revision, rather than a complete repudiation, of familiar theories espoused by
Posner, Calabresi, and others." Coleman argues that even in the penumbra of
tort practice, where appeals to market principles are most plausible, economic
theories misconstrue the principles at work. Because these theories are based
on the market paradigm, which he criticizes in Part I of Risks and Wrongs,
they wrongly assume that efficiency guides tort practice and that the goal of
tort law is to mimic the perfectly competitive market. Against this view,
Coleman argues that the aim in penumbral cases is and should be to safeguard
market cooperation from failure rather than to correct for failures of
competition. The hallmark of his revised market-oriented account of tort law
is not efficiency, but enhancing coordination, cooperation, and social stability.
Coleman also believes that economic theories of tort law fail more
fundamentally to explain the core of tort practice. He suggests that in their
attempt to provide a single, comprehensive rationale for tort practice, economic
theories seriously distort the practice. In particular, economic theories argue
that the principle of efficiency defines "fault," shaping the reasonable person
standard and the rule of negligence. Coleman argues that this is a mistake for
41. Id.
42. I call this the "practice-dependent" dimension of corrective justice. Coleman argues that whether
corrective justice imposes moral duties and rights on a community depends upon that community's
"prevailing legal and social practices." Id. at 199, 388-95, 401-05.
43. Coleman does not explicitly mention this point, but it seems that rational choice liberalism
logically implies it.
44. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW
(1987); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
[Vol. 103: 861
Risks, Wrongs, and Responsibility
the general reasons he advances in his critique of the market paradigm, but
also because efficiency does not play the role economic theories assign to it.4
Instead, he maintains that the standards defining the limits of reasonable risk
taking are local conventions. The idea behind such conventions is not to reduce
risks optimally, but to coordinate behavior rationally around a common
understanding of reasonableness. Coleman states that "[s]uccessful conventions
are efficient in the sense that they coordinate behavior, not necessarily in the
sense that they optimally reduce or spread risk." 46 He also suggests that
economic theories illegitimately conclude from their definition of fault that the
aim of fault liability is to discourage inefficient risk taking.47
The force of these objections depends on the soundness of a more
fundamental objection. Coleman argues that economic theories of tort practice
cannot adequately account for the distinctive structure of tort law.48 This
structure is characterized by case-by-case adjudication, which occurs between
victims and their alleged injurers, and is governed by a backward-looking
principle of liability and recovery. The explanations that economic theories
provide for these features are inadequate because economic theories do not
recognize that the principles governing tort litigation are rooted in the
relationship between the parties.49 According to such theories, the victim and
the injurer only contingently relate to each other and to the larger goals of tort
practice. Economic theories offer no principled reason for such a relationship,
relying entirely on tort law's goal of reducing accident costs for
justification. 50 Thus, Coleman insists that economic arguments for the structure
of tort litigation are the wrong kind of arguments.
This last objection recalls arguments frequently directed against utilitarian
accounts of rights, justice, or the value of liberty. Objections of this sort have
force only when intuition supports a noncontingent, principle-based account.
The objection seems less persuasive in the case of tort practice. Coleman never
makes it clear why it is important to account for the structural features of tort
practice in terms of deep principles, and certain aspects of his approach
suggest otherwise. For example, Coleman admits that the core of tort practice
is in flux, and that in twenty-five years it may shift its focus dramatically, and
perhaps even move away from corrective justice.5' An institution this fluid
seems an unlikely candidate for the kind of principled objection Coleman
45. RiSKS AND WRONGS, supra note 4, at 358-59.
46. Id. at 359.
47. Id. at 239-40.
48. Id. at 374-85 (arguing that liability is imposed "not to discourage inefficiency but to rectify
wrongful losses").
49. For example, Coleman notes that economic theories argue that the structure of tort law deters
injurers and provides incentives to the victim to initiate litigation, and that any wider scope would incur
unjustifiably high administrative costs. See id. at 377-80.
50. Id. at 380-81.
51. Id. at 198-99.
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raises.52 Moreover, justifications of legal institutions are likely to give greater
weight to considerations of expediency than are justifications of fundamental
moral concerns like rights, liberty, or justice. Add to this the fact that
Coleman's account of corrective justice concludes that changes in our formal
practices and institutions may entirely obviate principles of corrective justice,
and Coleman's objection to economic theories loses much of its force. I
believe that the worry underlying his objection is valid, but if it is to mature
into a decisive objection against a theoretical approach as powerful as
economic analysis, the argument needs to be developed more fully.
B. Coleman's Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice
According to Coleman, the distinctive structure of tort practice-which
focuses on the relationship between victim and injurer-is evidence of the
normative orientation of its core. The aim of tort law is to do justice between
the parties, i.e., to implement corrective justice. The focus of corrective justice
is on interpersonal transactions rather than on the structure of public
institutions. Compensation for loss, rights of recovery, and duties to repair are
the coin of this realm, but the standard for the currency lies in a morally
significant personal relationship between victim and injurer. These broad
features of corrective justice orient Coleman's search for the moral foundations
of the core of tort law.
Coleman articulates and defends what he terms a "mixed conception" of
corrective justice-mixed because it integrates into a single theory insights
from Weinrib's "relational conception"53 and Coleman's previously held
"annulment conception." '54 According to the mixed conception, the aim of
corrective justice is not to allocate risks or losses, as economic theories
maintain; to rectify wrongs, as the relational conception argues; nor merely to
compensate wrongful losses, as the annulment conception holds. Its aim is to
impose the duty to compensate wrongful losses upon the parties responsible
for them.5 This conception starts with the idea that a special moral relationship
is created between the parties when one person injures another. If the loss
incurred is wrongful, and the injurer is responsible for that wrongful loss, then
corrective justice imposes a duty on the injurer to repair the victim's loss.
56
The victim is not merely the de facto beneficiary of the duty; the duty is
52. One might also think that a theory that promises to explain both the current practice and the shift
in the focus, as an economic theory might do, would be more powerful that Coleman's hybrid.
53. Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAt,. U. L. REv. 485, 514-26 (1989); Ernest J.
Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 407, 444-50 (1987).
54. For Coleman's most extensive defense of this conception, see Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the
Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349, 365-69 (1992).
55. RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 4, at 324.
56. Id. at 326, 434.
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actually owed to the victim.57 Coleman's thesis is that injurers have a "duty [in
corrective justice] ... to repair only the wrongful losses for which they are
responsible."53 The "only" in this sentence is triply restrictive: the duty to
repair extends (a) only to the loss imposed, not to the wrong done; (b) only to
losses that are wrongful; and (c) only to wrongful losses for which the injurer
is responsible.
While our moral response to a tort may be to seek corrective and
retributive justice, these are actually separate responses. Retributive justice
concerns the wrong, the wrongdoer's culpability, and the appropriate response
of the public. Corrective justice focuses on the victim's loss and the claim to
repair for that loss; it is not concerned with punishing, blaming, or exculpating
the injurer, or with rectifying the wrong. Corrective justice also recognizes a
moral difference between claims of need created by misfortune and claims of
justice that arise from the wrongful actions of others. Corrective justice focuses
exclusively on the latter, leaving the former to distributive justice or
humanitarian concern. According to Coleman, the ambit of corrective justice
is limited to the wrongful losses of victims. Moreover, corrective justice
grounds the duty to repair loss in the fact that the injurer is responsible for the
loss, not just that the injurer did something wrong.59 Both the duty and the
right are derived from the "responsibility relationship" created between the
parties when the victim suffers a loss through the injurer's wrongful act or
omission.
This sketch of corrective justice needs an account of what makes losses
"wrongful" and an account of what makes some losses, but not others, the
injurer's "responsibility." Coleman begins to sketch accounts of wrongful
behavior and individual responsibility tailored to corrective justice, but he
acknowledges that much work remains to be done.
1. Wrongfulness and Necessity
A "wrongful loss," according to Coleman, is the harmful product of
wrongdoing, an unjustified setback of the victim's legitimate interests.60 The
victim's legitimate interests include, but are not limited to, her rights. Thus, a
loss may be wrongful because it is a consequence of the injurer's violation of
57. Id. at 354-57. I take this to imply that the victim has a correlative right against the injurer for
repair of the loss, although Coleman does not explicitly draw the inference.
58. Jules L. Coleman, The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, 77 IoWA L. REv. 427, 441 (1992).
In Risks and Wrongs, the same sentence is used without the word "only." RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note
4, at 324. However, this discrepancy is not significant, since the argument of the surrounding pages clearly
supports the restrictive reading.
59. Id. at 326. Coleman seems unable to talk of injurers acting wrongfully. But, if he is willing to refer
to morally justified infringements of rights as "wrongs," and the losses they bring about as "wrongful," it
is arbitrary to refuse to refer to such wrongs as ways of acting "wrongfully." I will do so even though it
is not consistent with Coleman's usage.
60. Id. at 329-32.
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the victim's rights. Some interests are legitimate, however, even though they
are not afforded the protection of rights. If I owned a pizza parlor, for
example, my interest in the success of my pizza parlor would be a legitimate
interest. The legitimate actions of one person may set back the legitimate
interests of another, as when a competitor makes a better pizza and drives me
out of business; similarly, a person's own wrongdoing may set back his own
legitimate interests. In neither of these cases would the losses be wrongful,
according to Coleman. However, if a competitor drives me out of business by
spreading false rumors about the sanitary conditions of my kitchen, then my
legitimate interest is set back through another's wrongdoing and my resulting
loss is wrongful. Similarly, if losses result from actions that unreasonably
exposed victims to the risk of harm, the actions are unjustified and the losses
are wrongful.
Coleman's account of wrongfulness of losses is not complete without an
account of the rights and legitimate interests we possess. Coleman also needs
to square his account of wrongful loss with the fact that corrective justice
imposes duties to repair on some injurers even though their actions are fully
justified. This is true, for example, in cases of necessity, where the injurer
seizes or uses the victim's property without authorization in order to prevent
more serious loss of life or property to the injurer or to some third party.61 In
such cases, courts have held the injurer liable for the loss suffered by the
victim even though the injurer's action was reasonable and justified. Like most
lawyers and philosophers, Coleman accepts that these decisions are correct and
consistent with corrective justice. Thus, he has only two options: place these
cases outside the core of tort practice and the ambit of corrective justice; or
incorporate them into his conception of corrective justice, making adjustments
in his understanding of wrongful loss where necessary. He chooses the latter
course.
If, according to the principles of corrective justice, an injurer acting with
full justification nevertheless has a duty to compensate victims for any
resulting losses, then it seems that we must abandon the idea that corrective
justice is concerned only with redress of wrongful losses. Any attempt to
charge the injurer with wrongdoing will be defeated by his justification on
grounds of necessity. However, Coleman rejects this way of adjusting his
theory; he proposes to recognize a category of "wrongs that are not always
wrongs," that is, rights invasions which are "wrong" but do not count as full-
fledged wrongdoings because they are justified.62 Some philosophers have said
that, although the justification overrides whatever direct claim the right-bearer
has on the forbearance of the injurer, the right retains its moral force. The
61. See, e.g., Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTS § 197 (1965).
62. RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 4, at 324.
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injurer has a residual obligation to compensate the victim for having invaded
the right.6 3 In this way, the moral status of the right-bearer, or the moral
importance of the interest protected by the right, is said to be acknowledged
despite the invasion. Following these philosophers, Coleman refers to justified
invasions of rights as rights "infringements," rather than rights violations. He
claims that such infringements are "wrongs" insofar as the rights are invaded;
but they are justified wrongs, and for that reason are "no one's fault."
6
Coleman locates the wrong in the injurer's failure to secure the victim's
permission to use the victim's property. This failure invades the victim's
rightful claim to exclusive control over the property.65 Thus, the injurer's
failure to secure the victim's permission is a wrong to the victim, even if
justice would have required the victim to permit the use and the use is fully
justified. This wrong grounds the injurer's duty to make good the victim's
losses in corrective justice. Corrective justice, then, is still concerned only with
the victim's wrongful losses, but it accepts that such losses may be the result
of either "wrongdoings" or "wrongs."
2. Responsibility, Fault, and Excuses
Coleman constructs his conception of corrective justice on the notion of
a "relationship of responsibility" between two individuals. This notion is
complex and must be carefully explained. Note, first, that while the
responsibility relationship is the source of the rights and duties assigned by
corrective justice, it is a sufficient, but not necessary, element of tort
liability.66 While the domain of corrective justice is restricted to responsibility
relationships, we may have strong moral or political reasons for extending tort
liability beyond that domain. Corrective justice only gives us an answer to the
question, "Who should bear the losses consequent upon the interactions
between individuals?" when a responsibility relationship exists between two
63. See JOEL FEINBERG, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE,
AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 221 (1980); JUDITH J. THOMSON, Rights and Compensation, in RIGHTS,
RESTrrUTION, AND RISKS 66-77 (V. Parent ed., 1986).
64. Coleman is reluctant to say that either the injurer or the injurer's conduct is at fault in such cases.
It is odd to speak of either the agent or the action as "faulty" when the agent acts with full justification.
However, it is just as odd to speak of infringements of rights as non-wrongful wrongs, as Coleman does.
RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 4, at 300. I argue below that there are good reasons to refuse to find fault
in necessity cases, but to acknowledge those reasons would be to acknowledge that there is no reason to
regard the injurer's action as a wrong or even an invasion of a right. Thus, Coleman's reluctance to speak
of fault here has its roots in a very different understanding of the moral dimensions of necessity cases than
he officially adopts. As long as he remains loyal to his official account, I believe that he has no substantive
reason for refusing to speak of the injurer's action as "faulty." To avoid what I regard as unnecessary
complications in laying out Coleman's theory, I will not follow him in this hesitation to talk of rights
infringements as "faulty."
65. Id. at 301-02.
66. Id. at 262-63.
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parties.67 If the parties are not in a responsibility relationship, then corrective
justice is silent regarding those parties. However, the question of who should
bear the losses remains. The best answer may be that the victim ought to bear
them, or the injurer, or the cheapest cost-avoider, or members of a pool of at-
fault agents, or the community at large. In Coleman's view, however, these
answers draw on sources beyond the horizons of corrective justice.68 Thus, it
may be fair to say that Coleman's hybrid interpretation of modem tort practice
is driven more by a basic feature of his theory of corrective justice than by
recalcitrant recent developments in tort law.
Second, Coleman focuses nearly all his attention in Risks and Wrongs on
the "responsibility" arising from the exercise of causal agency.69 The
"responsibility relationship" is a moral consequence of the causal effect one
party has on the interests of another. Coleman's thesis is that a causal relation
between two people alters their moral relationship and may even create a new
moral relationship. This is true even of causal relations involving bodily
movements that fail to meet minimal standards of human action, Coleman
believes;70 but it is especially true of causal relations brought about "through
the exercise of [our] powers of autonomous agency.
71
While Coleman makes a profoundly important point, we risk
misunderstanding his theory if we fail to see that it only sets the stage for his
account of responsibility. One such misunderstanding generates the objection
that Coleman's thesis confuses the morally neutral notion of causal
responsibility, which Coleman refers to as "responsibility as authorship," with
a morally loaded notion of responsibility that suggests that the consequences
of an agent's actions are "his fault.' 72 But Coleman does not confuse the two
notions and, indeed, takes pains to distinguish them. 73 Rather, he advances here
a substantive, and controversial, moral thesis. This thesis is interesting and
deserves more extensive argument than Coleman gives it.74
67. Note that the question is a normative inquiry into who ought to bear the losses, not a question
about who is likely to do so, or who may impose those losses if those who ought to bear them refuse to
do so.
68. Id. at 483 n.6.
69. See id. at 265, 326, 333-35, 345-47, 482 n. 10, 482-83 n.4. Coleman admits, however, that "being
connected to an event by the [causal] agency relationship may be only one of the many morally relevant
ways of being responsible for it." Id. at 274, 335. Because he does not elaborate, we can only speculate
about what he might have in mind. I suspect that he would account for causally troublesome cases of
omissions within this wider notion of responsibility.
70. Id. at 468 n.9.
71. Id. at 482 n.10.
72. See, e.g., Richard W. Wright, Substantive Corrective Justice, 77 IOWvA L. REv. 625, 681-82 (1992).
73. RSKS AND WRONGS, supra note 4, at 274-75.
74. He defends part of his thesis with the following remarks: "It is through the exercise of the powers
of autonomous agency that individuals make their mark in the world. It is through their actions that we
come to understand individuals, and, more importantly, it is through our actions that we come to our self-
understandings." Id. at 482 n.10. For a more fully developed argument along these lines, see Stephen R.
Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOwA L. REv. 449, 496-507 (1992).
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It is important to recognize that Coleman's notion of "responsibility" here
is a very thin, abstract one, lying between responsibility as mere authorship
and responsibility that licenses attributions of fault to either agent or action.
75
From the causal interaction alone we cannot infer anything about the specific
nature of the moral relationship or the duties and responsibilities of the parties
to the relationship. The content of the parties' duties and responsibilities is a
function of the nature and extent of their involvement in the causal interaction,
the kind of losses occasioned by it, the social context in which it took place,
and other morally relevant considerations. Rather than offer a theory of
responsibility relationships, Coleman builds his account of corrective justice
on a subset of such relationships. He believes that causal interaction may be
sufficient to generate a duty to apologize to or aid the party one injures, but
that corrective justice does not necessarily require compensation even if the
action is voluntary.76 Corrective justice is put on alert when causal interaction
between parties yields losses, but it is brought into play only when the victim's
losses are the causal consequence of the injurer's faulty action.77 In other
words, corrective justice demands compensation only when the injurer's
wrongful actions cause the victim's wrongful losses. Only this "thick" sort of
responsibility generates the rights and duties of corrective justice. The degree
of responsibility qualifies both the losses for which the victim can claim
redress in the name of corrective justice, and the parties from whom the victim
can claim that redress.
78
What is involved in this "thick" notion of responsibility? It begins with a
causal interaction, or "thin" responsibility relationship, between the parties.
Added to that, however, is the notion that the loss is the fault of the party
responsible. Coleman insists that the kind of fault that activates corrective
justice is fault in the action rather than fault in the agent.79 If the fault is in the
75. For the distinction between fault in the agent and fault in the action, see infra Part IV.B.
76. RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 4, at 468 n.9.
77. Unless non-causal responsibility is involved. See infra Part IV.A.4. Recall, I am using "fault" here
where Coleman in his official version would not. See RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 4, at 346-47.
78. Coleman's language sometimes suggests that the basis of the victim's right to redress is different
from that of the injurer's duty to repair. For example, Coleman says that "losses are the concern of
corrective justice if they are wrongful.... [The duty to repair those wrongful losses is grounded not in
the fact that they are the result of wrongdoing, but in the fact that the losses are the injurer's responsibility,
the result of his agency." Id. at 326. This has led some critics to believe that it is Coleman's view that
corrective justice would impose a duty to repair on a person who made some causal contribution to the
victim's wrongful loss, but whose action plays no part in the wrongfulness of the loss. See Ernest J.
veinrib, Non-Relational Relationships: A Note on Coleman's New Theory, 77 IOWNA L. REv. 445, 446-47
(1992); Wright, supra note 70, at 681. The point of Coleman's distinction is not to introduce different
grounds for the right and the duty, however, but to shift the ground of the duty from the doing of wrong,
which is the "relational conception's" view, to the "responsibility relationship." It is the injurer's
responsibility for the loss, and not the doing of the wrong, that brings corrective justice to bear. For a
similar reading of Coleman's thesis, see Stephen R. Perry, The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice,
15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 917, 922-23 (1992). Of course, Coleman believes that the exercise of causal
agency alone is not sufficient to create a duty to repair, see RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 4, at 468 n.9;
the injurer's action must be faulty in the sense described below.
79. Id. at 217-19, 333-35.
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agent, then the agent has some character defect that accounts for the
wrongdoing and the wrongful loss; thus the agent is culpable and morally
blameworthy. Culpability-defeating excuses are aimed at charges of fault in the
agent.80 One can argue that the agent is not properly blamed because her action
did not issue from any defect of character or motivation, or because her action
was not wrong. In contrast, when the fault is in the action, culpability-
defeating excuses are not sufficient to defeat attribution of fault or the moral
consequences that flow from it. An action is faulty when it fails to meet some
relevant standard, even if the agent cannot be said to have failed.8 ' Corrective
justice is not concerned with culpability, distributing blame, or righting
wrongs. Instead, it imposes a duty to repair wrongful losses. Coleman argues
that, for that purpose, the relevant fault is that of the agent's doing. Neither
culpability-defeating excuses nor justifications can defeat an injurer's duty to
repair a loss when the fault is in the action. Thus, corrective justice is
legitimately concerned with infringements of rights, even though the agent's
invasion of the right is fully justified. In such cases, the action falls short of
the standard that mandates securing permission before invading the right.
Note, however, that not every excuse is ruled out by this focus on faulty
acts, for faulty acts still require agents. Thus, agency-defeating
excuses-claims that one's bodily movements did not meet minimal conditions
for voluntary human action--are sufficient to defeat a claim of
responsibility.8 3 Human agency is necessary, if not sufficient, for there to be
fault in the action.
The final component of Coleman's "thick" notion of responsibility
concerns the causal connection between action and loss. For the loss to be the
fault of the agent, the faulty action must be causally connected to the victim's
loss "in the appropriate way," and the victim's loss must fall within the scope
of the risks that render the conduct faulty.s4 Coleman here considers various
rules typically discussed under the rubric of "proximate cause." He understands
these rules to be conditions of responsibility rather than conditions of
causation. Although he does not intend his discussion of these conditions to be
exhaustive, it is clear that the scope of "thick" responsibility is much narrower
than that of the "thin" responsibility on which he constructed his broader
conception of corrective justice. His broader conception is clearly a fault
theory of corrective justice. Thus, it can only account for strict liability cases
either by relegating them to the "penumbra" of tort practice, or by
reinterpreting them under a special theory of fault liability. Coleman favors the
latter approach, arguing that dangerous animal and ultrahazardous materials
80. Id. at 217-18.
81. Id. at 217.
82. For example, muscle twitches, epileptic fits, or conduct under hypnotic trance.
83. Id. at 334-35.
84. Id. at 346-47.
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cases are best understood as negligence cases, where the fault lies not in the
manner of the action, but in the action itself.85 In such cases, any manner of
engaging in the actions in question is faulty. Coleman appears to treat the
remaining strict liability cases as he did the necessity cases, as justified
infringements of rights for which a duty to repair is imposed by corrective
justice.1
6
3. Wrongful Conduct and Local Conventions
Thus far we have considered the analytic structure of the account of
wrongdoing on which Coleman's mixed conception depends. The moral
substance of his theory derives from our views about what rights we have,
which of our interests are legitimate and worthy of moral recognition, and the
limits of reasonable risk-taking. Thus, corrective justice, in a way, depends on
a substantive theory of wrongdoing, including, or presupposing, a theory of
distributive justice. Yet Coleman insists that it would be a mistake simply to
reduce corrective justice to distributive justice, or to regard the former merely
as the servant of the latter.87 Corrective justice, he argues, enjoys "moral
independence" from distributive justice for two reasons. First, while the
background distributive theory determines what conduct is wrongful, and may
substantially affect the content of the rights and duties of corrective justice, it
does not determine the point of corrective justice.8 The point is to repair
wrongful losses by imposing the duty to do so on those responsible for them.
This may in fact sustain principles of right conduct, but the focus of corrective
justice is on the loss suffered and the relationships of the victim and injurer to
that loss. While the collateral benefits of corrective justice may be an
important part of its appeal to rational cooperators, they clearly do not define
the practice.
Second, the background distributive theory must be tailored to the
distinctive focus of corrective justice. Corrective justice involves parties whose
relationship arose from the causal interaction between them as they found each
other, that is, as participants in a distribution of resources and entitlements and
a structure of social interaction. In a sense, corrective justice is part of what
Rawls calls "non-ideal" theory, not because it assumes that ideal rules have
been violated, but because it has a moral job to do even when conditions fall
short of the moral ideal.8 9 As a form of justice, on the other hand, it purports
85. Id. at 367-69.
86. Id. at 371-72.
87. Id. at 304-05, 348-54.
88. Id. at 348.
89. This is one way of understanding Aristotle's puzzling claim that corrective justice starts from the
assumption that the parties are "equal" See ARIsTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 125 (Terence Irwin trans.,
1985). Coleman, however, does not claim Aristotle as an authority.
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to define real moral rights and duties and to yield real moral reasons for
action, so it cannot be entirely insensitive to the injustice of background
conditions. 90 Thus, the background distributive theory must define the rights,
legitimate interests, and limits of reasonable risk-taking with reference to actual
living conditions.
Coleman does not develop this part of his theory in any detail, but guides
our thoughts in two ways. First, he suggests that although the existing scheme
of recognized rights and legitimate interests need not meet the demands of
ideal theory, it must be sufficiently defensible on rational moral grounds to
justify protecting it against invasion by individuals. 9' We might regard the
scheme as vulnerable to attempts to restructure society along lines that more
closely approximate distributive justice, but believe that relations among
individuals must be governed by the imperfect structure currently in place until
this society-wide restructuring is accomplished.
Second, Coleman argues that the limits of reasonable risk-taking are
defined not by "global," or universally applicable principles, but by informal
local conventions. 92 The norms of wrongdoing presupposed by corrective
justice "will reflect conventions within the relevant community of
individuals.... [regarding] reasonable risk taking activity and the conventional
understandings by which those norms are to be interpreted." 93 Coleman
defends his claim with the following argument. Corrective justice is justice
between parties. This implies that corrective justice is not concerned merely
with wrongs, but more specifically with wrongs done to others. He claims that:
"In order for my duty to you to be a duty in corrective justice, it must be
because I have wronged you in an appropriate sense." 94 This claim implies,
in turn, that I "have invaded a norm regulating the affairs between us," and
that invasion "imposes responsibilities on each of us to the other."95 Thus, not
only the duties to repair imposed on the injurer as a moral consequence of his
wrong, but also the norms defining the wrongful conduct itself must be
"directed" or "relational." Global principles, like principles of efficiency or
distributive justice, fail to satisfy this condition; violating them is wrong, but
the wrong is not necessarily a wrong to anyone.96 Only informal conventions
that arise from and reinforce the mutual expectations of the parties are properly
considered "local." These conventions will be local in the sense that they arise
from the interactions of individuals in a relatively circumscribed community,
and will provide a framework of trust and mutual expectations to coordinate
90. RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 4, at 350-51.
91. Id. at 352.
92. Id. at 357-59.
93. Id. at 358.
94. Id. at 356.
95. Id. at 356-57.
96. Id. at 355-57.
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interpersonal affairs. Thus, Coleman concludes, local conventions are at the
very core of corrective justice.
Coleman's thesis is compelling, but I have four concerns about his
argument for the thesis. First, I see no reason why the norms of wrongdoing
themselves must be "between the parties." This conclusion does not follow
from the fact that corrective justice is concerned exclusively with justice
between parties. Second, duties and rights of corrective justice might arise
between parties with no other personal or direct moral relationship other than
that which arose from their causal interaction. There may be no other shared
norms of reasonable risk-taking between them. Their causal interaction creates
a responsibility relationship between them and that is enough to establish the
"directionality" of the moral duty in question. Third, social norms may
coordinate social interaction and yet not be "local" in any sense that can give
meaning to the idea of justice "between the parties." Finally, we have no
guarantee that local norms, even local coordination norms, can fund the kind
of moral "directionality" that Coleman expects of corrective justice. Why
would the violation of a local coordination norm yield the conclusion that the
violator has wronged a particular member of some local community? Do
violations of fashion norms, for example, yield such "directional wrongs"?
C. The Practice-Dependent Dimension of Corrective Justice
Coleman argues that the core of tort practice implements corrective justice,
but its penumbra departs substantially from the dictates of corrective justice.97
To avoid the charge that his hybrid theory of tort practice is ad hoc and
incoherent, Coleman argues that the demands of corrective justice are context-
sensitive. Both the existence and the content of the duties and rights of
corrective justice depend on the environment of social practices and institutions
in which victims and injurers interact. Coleman's account of this practice-
dependent dimension of corrective justice is essential to his defense of tort
practice as a coherent mix of markets and morals.
Many different compensation schemes are possible. They include the
"localized at-fault pool" schemes found in Hymowitz, 98 "cheapest cost-avoider"
or "deepest pocket" principles, and comprehensive social insurance schemes
like New Zealand's no-fault plan.99 Coleman argues that to believe that such
alternative compensation schemes conflict with corrective justice is to believe
97. Coleman locates most of modem products liability law in the penumbra. See id. at 407-29. He also
locates such cases as Sindell and Hymowitz in the penumbra, on the grounds that they are best understood
as efforts by the courts to implement a localized at-fault pool scheme to deal with serious injuries where
it is especially difficult for the plaintiff to prove causation by any specific manufacturer. Id. at 397-406.
98. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989).
99. See D.R. Harris, Accident Compensation in New Zealand: A Comprehensive Insurance System, 37
MOD. L. REv. 361 (1974).
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that the rights and duties imposed by corrective justice compete with the
political aims served by the alternative compensation schemes. He suggests
that such a view is mistaken, for if a victim can recover fully under an
alternative scheme, then the victim has no right to repair against the injurer
under corrective justice, and the injurer has no corresponding duty."° Coleman
states that "whether or not corrective justice in fact imposes moral duties on
particular individuals is conditional upon the existence of other institutions for
making good victims' claims to repair."' ' He himself suggests that we might
understand this conditionality by analogy to the discharge of a debtor's
obligation by a third party.'02 If my Dutch uncle pays off a debt of mine
unbeknownst to me, I am no longer in debt. In that case, my duty is
discharged and my creditor's right is satisfied. Unfortunately, this analogy
invites irrelevant objections and obscures Coleman's point.'0 3
The analogy assumes that the debtor already has a duty, and the creditor
a right, and the only question is from whom does the money come to satisfy
that duty. However, Coleman believes that where alternative compensation
schemes are functioning properly, the rights and duties of corrective justice
simply do not arise." How can this be? Recall that Coleman suggests that
corrective justice is put on alert by the causal relationship among the injurer,
the victim, and the victim's loss, but is called into action only under certain
additional conditions. When those conditions are met, corrective justice links
the injuring agent with the victim's losses by imposing on the injurer a duty
to repair, and by granting the victim a right to recover against that person. The
victim's moral claim to recover is part of the normative basis of the injurer's
duty to make good the loss; so, too, is the responsibility relationship among
victim, injurer, and loss. But they do not automatically yield the duty to repair.
"The nature and scope of the duty depend on the practices in place," Coleman
insists.10 5 The reason that the duty to repair is practice dependent is that the
morally appropriate response to that loss depends on, among other things, the
best way to meet its claim under the circumstances. Those circumstances
100. RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 4, at 402. This is true, he claims, as long as there is an adequate
justification for the alternative scheme.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 327.
103. See, e.g., Richard Arneson, Rational Contractarianism, Corrective Justice, and Tort Law, 15
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 889, 900-01 (1992); Wright, supra note 76. Ameson and Wright point out the
disanalogy between third-party discharge of debts and a social insurance compensation scheme. The latter
is coercive, while the former is not. Coleman's reply to this sort of objection, see RISKS AND WRONGS,
supra note 4, at 389-90, only makes sense if we abandon this obligation-discharge model for the default-
displacement model he outlines later. See id. at 402-03.
104. Id. at 493-94 n.7. Coleman sometimes says that these other practices "extinguish" the duties of
corrective justice, but this also is misleading. It suggests that the rights and duties are standing rights and
duties, but in fact they arise from the actions and interactions of people. According to Coleman, if those
actions and interactions take place in social contexts in which other compensatory practices or institutions
exist, then questions of corrective justice simply do not arise.
105. Id. at 403.
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include the formal and informal practices for meeting that claim that are
already in place in a community. If there is at least an informal practice of
corrective justice already in place in the community, corrective justice can
operate as a kind of default option. 0 6 Corrective justice will determine the
nature and scope of the rights and duties of the parties, but alternative means
of responding to morally important losses can displace or narrow the scope of
corrective justice, if the community has sound reasons for responding in that
way. In such cases, Coleman believes that even though a wrongful action of
the injurer caused the victim's loss, the injurer has no duty to repair in
corrective justice. Of course, the injurer may still justifiably be held liable for
the victim's loss or have a moral duty to make good the loss. Similarly, the
victim may still have a legal or moral right to recover. But the liability, duties,
and rights will, in that case, have their sources in other moral principles or
political aims.
This, then, is Coleman's explanation of how modern tort practice could
serve two masters without dividing the house. His default-displacement model
is intelligible and illuminating, and I think it could do the job of reconciling
the two masters, if Coleman's statements about corrective justice are true. I am
not yet convinced, however, that the model gives a true description of the
moral claims of corrective justice. What feature of corrective justice's
normative structure renders it practice-dependent? This question cannot be
answered by external observers of the practice, say, by rational cooperators.
Coleman himself notes that rational cooperators are not sensitive to the internal
workings or goals of the practices they consider."7 They can appreciate and
assess the coordination-enabling and stability-enhancing properties of the
practice, but they are not reliable guides to the intrinsic merits of various social
cooperation schemes. The question I have just asked is internal to the practice;
it is a question about the point of the practice.
Coleman's detailed analytical account of corrective justice does not
directly address this question. Nevertheless, his theory is built around a view
or intuition about the fundamental concern of corrective justice. This view is
put in sharp relief in his discussion of the circumstances under which
corrective justice loses its significance.' 08 What he finds fundamentally
important to corrective justice is that human losses suffered at the hands of
others, especially those caused by the wrongful acts of others, must be
redressed, and the victim made whole. Other aims-such as holding persons
106. Id. at 493-94 n.7.
107. Id. at 12.
108. Compare Hume's discussion of the circumstances of justice. DAVID HuME, ENQUIRIES 183-92
(L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d ed. rev. 1975). Hume argues that in conditions of superabundance or radical
scarcity of material resources, or where everyone is an unreconstructed egoist or uncompromising altruist,
justice simply has no point. From this observation Rawls concludes that justice is best understood as "a
cooperative enterprise for mutual advantage." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 126 (1971).
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responsible for their actions, recognizing the autonomy of others, or giving
moral meaning to interpersonal relationships-to the extent that they play any
role in Coleman's account of corrective justice, are secondary and derivative.
They do not survive satisfaction of the fundamental aim, the victim's being
made whole. Once the loss is redressed, nothing remains for corrective justice
to do. In this respect, Coleman's new mixed conception has not moved far
from his earlier annulment conception.
However, if this accurately represents Coleman's view of what lies at the
very heart of corrective justice, then he leaves us room to ask why fault plays
such a large role in his mixed conception. I suspect that Coleman has
misplaced the notion of fault in his account of corrective justice, giving it
greater importance than it deserves, and more importance than he can
ultimately defend in view of the basic orientation of his account. In the
concluding part of this Review, I will suggest some reasons for this
assessment.
IV. PUTrING FAULT IN ITS PLACE
Let us accept Coleman's thesis that causal interaction between parties
producing a significant loss in well-being yields a special moral relationship
among the injurer, victim, and the loss. While this thesis needs more argument
than he provides, it is too large a topic to pursue here. Even if we accept this
thesis, it is only the beginning of our account of corrective justice, for the
"responsibility relationship" alone does not define the domain of corrective
justice. Coleman insists that this domain is defined by the notion of fault in the
action. This concept determines the focus of corrective justice, which, Coleman
argues, is to impose the duty to compensate a wrongful loss upon the party
responsible.0 9
This narrowing of the focus of corrective justice is premature, in my view.
Coleman is entitled to draw that conclusion only after serious reflection on the
central normative principles of corrective justice. While fault may turn out to
be the central notion of corrective justice, this may not be assumed, it must be
shown. We -have accepted that causal interaction between injurer and victim
yields a morally significant relationship and that this defines the scope of
corrective justice. We also know that corrective justice is a kind of
commutative justice, concerned not with intimate personal relations, but with
"external" transactions between individuals."' Against this minimal
background, we might initially suggest that corrective justice is concerned with
the question of where the losses arising from such transactions should fall.
Who must bear the losses and how they should be shared are questions of
109. RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 4, at 324.
110. See, e.g., AQUINAS, supra note 1, at 41.
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justice. Because corrective justice arises from external transactions between
individuals, it limits the scope of potential loss-bearers to the injurer and
victim. Thus, the central substantive question for corrective justice is: What
principles govern the allocation of the losses? We may find that the principle
of fault is a necessary and important part of the answer, but it may figure only
as one principle among others.
This does not yet offer a theory of corrective justice, but it suggests how
to proceed in constructing such a theory. This approach has several attractive
features. First, it provides us with a principled rather than ad hoc basis for
determining the nature and scope of the injurer's responsibility, which is
relevant to corrective justice. Second, it enables us to identify and explore the
differences and continuities between corrective justice and other species of
justice, distributive justice in particular. Third, it acknowledges that tort
practice has more than one goal, but looks for a unifying theory behind those
goals. We may be able to identify shared principles of corrective and
distributive justice that might help unify the seemingly disparate parts of the
practice.
These are, of course, only speculative hopes at this point. I cannot argue
the more constructive aspects of this suggestion here. Instead, I argue that
Coleman has misplaced the notion of fault in his own account, and suggest
how his most important insights might be better accommodated by the view
of corrective justice I have just described. I begin with a critical discussion of
his analysis of necessity and propose an alternative account that fits better with
our moral intuitions and with tort practice. In the concluding section, I argue
that Coleman's notion of fault in the action is more plausibly regarded as a
principle of allocation than a principle of fault, and that he should embrace the
allocation framework suggested above as his theory of corrective justice.
A. Faultless Necessity
As discussed above, Coleman accepts that necessity cases are part of the
core of tort practice. This forces him to explain why injurers acting with full
justification nevertheless owe a duty in corrective justice to repair the losses
they cause. A fair allocation model of corrective justice provides a simple
explanation. One might argue, for example, that necessity justifies the
temporary use of another's property to deflect an immediate and serious threat
to life or property, but does not justify the permanent shift of self-protection
costs to that other person. Fairness requires that the beneficiary bear those
costs. II
i ll. In cases involving self-defense, other considerations, such as the fact that the person on whom
the loss is initially imposed is typically an unjust aggressor, may also be relevant. That fact might
reasonably defeat any claim the "victim" might have to share the losses with the injurer. The moral
question is more complex when the supposed aggressor is innocent, and I have no ready solution for the
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A fault-oriented conception of corrective justice, on the other hand, needs
more conceptual dexterity to accommodate necessity cases. Coleman holds that
infringements of rights automatically trigger victims' rights to repair, regardless
of the moral nature of the invasion."' Accordingly, the necessitous injurer
wrongs the victim by using her property without securing her consent, giving
the victim a right to compensation.' 3 This explanation of the place of necessity
cases in corrective justice, I argue, is counterintuitive, inconsistent with a
central feature of Coleman's conception of corrective justice, and inconsistent
with tort practice. I offer an alternative explanation that has deep roots in the
history of jurisprudence, is better grounded in substantive morality, and better
fits standard tort doctrine.
1. Infringement and the "Moral Residue"
Coleman should have held firm to his basic intuition that, in necessity
cases, there is neither wrongdoing nor fault in either the agent or the action.
He was moved, however, by the thought that "settling on the justifiability of
someone's conduct ... does not preclude the existence in justice or morality
of residual claims, including those to compensation."' 4 This observation
leads him to regard the compensation required by corrective justice in such
cases as the moral response to the infringement of a right. I do not reject the
notion of a "moral residue," but I believe that the residual claims Coleman and
others have in mind are not claims of corrective justice.
My argument begins with Hume's observation regarding the expressive
dimension of moral action. "[T]he principal part of an injury," Hume said, "is
the contempt and hatred, which [the action] shews in the person, that injures
us; and without that, the mere harm gives us a less sensible uneasiness. ' '" S
Actions have natural consequences, and they also communicate messages of
respect or contempt; sometimes those messages are of greater importance to
the victim than the natural consequences of the actions. The actions may signal
contempt because the agent denied the victim's claim to the agent's
consideration, and thus denied the victim's moral status.
innocent aggressor problem. The law seems no more confident about these cases. In cases of self-defense
or necessity in which third parties are either victims or beneficiaries, corrective justice on the model I have
hinted at may have less trouble than traditional tort law. For tort law forces all such problems into a rigid
bilateral mold, despite the fact that these cases have a multilateral character that corrective justice as I
conceive it could easily recognize. There may be pragmatic or institutional reasons for the bilateral focus
of tort practice, but, unlike Coleman, I do not see any deep or principled reasons for it. If these institutional
constraints turn out to be unavoidable, we may be forced to accept that tort practice can only imperfectly
implement our commitment to corrective justice.
112. RIsKS AND WRONGS, supra note 4, at 300.
113. Id. at 301-02, 475-76 n.7.
114. Id. at 302.
115. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 349 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d ed. rev. 1978).
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With this in mind, let us consider the role of the "moral residue." Where
an important right or interest has been invaded, the public message may be
contempt. This message may be sent even when the action is justified, in
which case the message would be false. For just that reason, however, it may
be incumbent upon the agent to take appropriate steps to counter that message.
This action may be taken with sincere expressions of regret, reinforced by
efforts to compensate the losses suffered by the victim. In this context,
compensation for the loss plays an instrumental role: it is the means by which
the good faith of the injurer is effectively communicated. The point is not to
undo the harm, but to counter the message of contempt otherwise
communicated to the victim.
If an action infringes upon an important interest or expectation of a family
member, lover, or friend, the moral residue has a further function.
Compensation is one of many ways to express commitment to the other party
and the relationship when that commitment is brought into question. It is
important because it expresses the agent's commitment, not only to the
relationship but also to the other person, by directly addressing his or her well-
being.
These are the most important functions of the moral residue, but it is clear
that they are not functions of corrective justice. Corrective justice concerns the
"external" interactions of individuals, focusing on the harm, not the heart. The
previously considered reasons for compensating harm would apply equally in
cases where a person infringes on the rights or interests of another to avoid a
public disaster. Thus, it would be important for the agent to counter the false
message of contempt when the actions are justified by the prevention of
significant public harms. Standard tort doctrine does not require this, however,
and we would not expect such a requirement from corrective justice.
Similarly, if corrective justice were concerned with moral residue, we
would expect that an injurer's duty to compensate could not be discharged by
others, or supplanted by formal institutional devices to redress losses. Residual
compensation addresses a distinctly interpersonal moral problem. Such
compensation concerns the message the agent's action communicated to the
victim about the agent's regard for the victim's moral status. This is not the
task for a surrogate. Thus, it is unlikely that corrective justice is concerned
with the moral residue of rights-invading actions, and one important motivation
for following the "rights infringement" line in necessity cases evaporates.
2. On the Right to Refuse Access
Coleman's theory that the wrong done by the necessity-driven injurer is
her failure to secure the victim's permission does not fit with standard
19931
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necessity doctrine in American tort law. The clear message of Ploof v.
Putnam"6 is that under conditions of necessity, the owner whose property
stands to be taken has no right to refuse access. In other words, the owner who
refuses to permit access to her property in an emergency violates a duty to the
party in need. Coleman reads Ploof differently, however. He suggests that its
thesis is that the owner fully retains his right to refuse access, but wrongly
exercises that right in doing so, and may be held liable for any resulting
harm.
117
There is nothing incoherent in the suggestion that there are rights it would
be wrong to exercise. In law, however, the notion is typically restricted to the
exercise of rights out of malicious or other seriously objectionable motives.
Coleman's hesitant language in discussing PlooP8 suggests that even he finds
his reading something of a stretch. The analogies on which Ploof drew
involved cases in which mere trespass on the land of another was recognized
as justified under conditions of necessity, and no right to compensation for the
trespass was recognized." 9 A right to compensation, it seems, can be justified
only if there is damage, and it is for the loss suffered due to that damage that
compensation must be paid. This suggests strongly that the legal tradition in
which Ploof was working did not regard the intrusion on the owner's land to
be an infringement of the owner's right to exclude. Indeed, in these mere
trespass cases, it recognized no invasion at all. The owner's right to exclude
played no important role.
Also, Coleman's solution to the puzzle of whether an injurer has a duty
to compensate the victim of a justified action seems inconsistent with the main
thrust of his conception of corrective justice. Coleman rejects the relational
conception of corrective justice on the ground that it fails to connect the actual
focus of compensation on the victim's loss with the expressed aim of
corrective justice according to the relational conception, to rectify the wrong
done. 20 There is a similar failed connection in Coleman's explanation of the
"wrong" involved in standard necessity cases. He believes that the wrong lies
in the injurer's invasion of the owner's right to exclude. While the agent's use
of the property is justified, the failure to secure consent constitutes a
wrong.'2 ' The injurer is still only bound to compensate the loss occasioned by
116. 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908).
117. RiSKS AND WRONGS, supra note 4, at 301-02.
118. See id. at 301.
119. See Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. at 189.
120. RIsKS AND WRONGS, supra note 4, at 314-15.
121. See id. at 301-02. I am not sure that this accurately states Coleman's view. Perhaps both the use
and the failure to secure permission from the owner are justified. But then why single out the right to
exclude as the locus of the invasion of the right? If, on the other hand, the failure to secure permission is
not justified, then we might conclude, contrary to Coleman's hypothesis and the doctrinal tradition, that
there is a genuine fault-bearing wrong done by using without permission. In any case, my argument is that
as long as the locus of the wrong is the failure to secure permission, compensation for the damage simply
does not connect to the wrong done.
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the use of the property; the injurer is not required to compensate the owner's
loss of opportunity to refuse another use of the property.2 2 It is not clear what
form of compensation would be appropriate for the latter invasion, but there
is no reason to assume that it would be accomplished by compensating losses
consequent upon using the property.
3. A Grotian Approach to Compensation in Cases of Necessity
Coleman considers and rejects an alternative solution to the necessity
conundrum,'23 according to which necessity justifies the agent's use of the
property and temporarily suspends the owner's right to refuse access. The
owner's right to compensation for any damage remains despite the agent's
necessity, and the agent's duty to compensate flows from that right. The
language of the Calabresi-Melamed "property rule/liability rule" distinction
allows a more precise statement of this solution. 24 In ordinary circumstances,
an owner's interest in property is protected by a conjunction of a property rule,
which imposes a duty on others to refrain from using the property without the
owner's consent, and a liability rule, which imposes on unauthorized users a
duty to compensate the owner for any resulting damages. In circumstances of
necessity, the property rule is temporarily suspended relative to the party in
necessity, but the liability rule remains in place.
Necessity conceived in this way is sometimes said to provide a conditional
justification, 12 but this can be misleading. Theorists over the centuries, from
Samuel Pufendorf 26 to Robert Keeton,12 7 have understood conditional
justification in terms of the intentions of the agent acting in circumstances of
necessity. The action is justified if the agent intends to compensate any losses
resulting from the use of another's property. On the other hand, the above-
mentioned theory does not consider the agent's intentions. It is better to regard
the necessity as justifying a temporary suspension of the owner's right to
refuse access to the property regardless of the injurer's intent, and creating a
122. According to the German doctrine of Aufopferungsanspruch, or "a claim based on sacrifice," the
dock owner's right to compensation in Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910),
arises from the fact that the plaintiff was forced to sacrifice his ordinary right to expel an intruder because
the ship that docked without permission was in imminent danger. See George P. Fletcher, The Search for
Synthesis in Tort Theory, 2 LAW, & PHIL. 63, 87 (1983). This doctrine also locates the source of the right
in the wrong place. Compensation focuses on damage or harm done, not on the loss of the right.
123. RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 4, at 295-96, 302. Coleman's discussion of this alternative is
illuminating, but he assumes that it would only be attractive to economic or utilitarian theorists. This is a
mistake. A theory embracing this alternative would not have to adopt efficiency or utility maximization as
its normative goal, nor would it have to deny, as economic theories do, that one important interest protected
by rights is an individual's interest in control over his or her life.
124. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-10 (1972).
125. See RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 4, at 291.
126. See 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 302 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A.
Oldfather trans., 1934) (1688).
127. See Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARv. L. REv. 401 (1959).
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right temporarily to impose the costs of the agent's actions on the owner.
Thus, no wrong is done and no right is violated by the agent's use of the
property. If the injurer later fails to assume those costs, a wrong is committed.
Feinberg put it well when he said, "[o]ne owes compensation here for the same
reason one must repay a debt or return what one has borrowed."'28 Like
paying off a debt, compensating losses caused by one's actions in
circumstances of necessity respects the owner's right, but is not required in
response to the infringement of that right. Unlike incurring a debt, however,
incurring the duty to compensate in circumstances of necessity involves no
voluntary temporary transfer of property by the owner.
The solution that Coleman rejects is sounder than his infringement
solution, and is consistent with standard tort doctrine. However, the choice
between this solution and Coleman's ultimately turns on the substantive
question of which best fits with our justification of the institution of private
property. I will attempt to show how my proposal fits more comfortably into
such a theory.
There are two different kinds of restrictions on rules: exceptions and
limitations.'29 The distinction turns on the relation between the restriction and
the rule's underlying justification. A restriction is an exception to a rule if it
is the outcome of a conflict between the principle served by the rule and some
other principle threatened by compliance. In contrast, a restriction is a
limitation on a rule if it is a direct consequence of the rule's underlying
justification. 30 Limitations express the boundaries of the scope of a rule as
determined by its underlying rationale.
Coleman's infringement approach treats circumstances of necessity as an
exception to the rules defining the rights of ownership. He believes that his
theory expresses our intuitive sense that "there is a conflict of claims that
needs to be accommodated . . . ,, 3' He states that "necessity morally
justifies the appropriation-thus giving rise to the injurer's claim-and the
128. FEINBERG, supra note 61, at 230. However, in the next sentence Feinberg says, "[i]f the other
had no right that was infringed in the first place, one could hardly have the duty to compensate him." Id.
This, of course, is inconsistent with the view expressed in the passage quoted above, for when one repays
a debt one is not compensating a right infringed, but rather taking steps to respect the right of the creditor.
129. See JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 147-48 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1970); see also Gerald
J. Postema, The Principle of Utility and the Law of Procedure: Bentham's Theory of Adjudication, 11 GA.
L. REV. 1393, 1411-14 (1977).
130. I have also phrased this distinction between exceptions and limitations as follows:
Exceptions to the rule arise when the primary reasons for the rule are overridden in the
circumstances by countervailing reasons. In such a case, there may still be reasons to follow the
rule, but they are overridden in the circumstances.... Limitations, in contrast, define the scope
of the reasons on which the rule rests for its justification. Where there is a rule-plus-limitation
-- e.g. 'no one, save the owner of the property, may freely make use of it'---the reasons
justifying the qualified rule do not extend to an unqualified version of the rule. Thus,
considerations justifying a limitation do not conflict with the rationale behind a rule .... They
conflict only with the unqualified rule.
GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 343 (1986).
131. RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 4, at 298.
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property right of the victim justifies the claim to repair. '' 3' This assumes that
justice gives an owner the right to refuse anyone access to the property
regardless of the circumstances. This right is qualified by "morality" in cases
of necessity. The justice-based argument emerges again, however, as a
justification of a "residual" duty to compensate for infringement of the right.
A long tradition, extending at least as far back as Grotius, takes a different
and more plausible view of the moral status of property rights in circumstances
of necessity. Grotius believed that each individual's fundamental claim to the
resources necessary for life in the state of nature creates a right to use the
material resources of nature. That right incorporates the right to refuse access
to others only to the extent that consuming the fruits of nature makes them
unavailable to others. Grotius argued that the institution of private property is
justified because it better enables individuals to fulfill their needs, the same
needs that justify their limited right to extract goods from the commons in the
state of nature. The original right to use generates both the institution of
property and its limitations. Grotius believed that in modem society the
institution of property must recognize the right of necessity in order to protect
the original right to use. 33 The right of necessity justifies one's use of things
owned by others without their consent, but the owner's property right is not
destroyed, only limited to a right to be compensated for the use of the thing.
Grotius is very clear about the moral grounds of this right of necessity: "The
reason ... is not, as some allege, that the owner of a thing is bound by the
rule of love to give to him who lacks; it is, rather, that all things seem to have
been distributed to individual owners with a benign reservation in favour of the
primitive right."'' 4 Thus, it is not charity, a general duty of mutual aid, or
any other independent principle that grounds the right of necessity. Instead, the
right is grounded in the justification of the institution of property itself. The
right of necessity is a limitation expressing the natural boundaries of the
general justification of property rights.
The Grotian approach looks to the underlying justification for property
rights in order to determine the scope of the normal bundle of ownership
rights. This underlying justification may best be served by a structure of rights,
powers, immunities, and disabilities, and their Hohfeldian correlatives that is
sensitive to the circumstances of the owner and other potential users of the
property. When individuals find themselves in circumstances of great need, the
justification for a fully exclusive property right meets its natural limit. In such
cases, the right to refuse access is suspended. The owner's claim is not
completely extinguished, however, as the owner has a right to compensation
for the use.
132. Id. at 298.
133. HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 193-94 (F.W. Kelsey trans., 1964) (1625);
see also STEPHEN BUCKLE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY: GROTIUS TO HUME 46 (1991).
134. GROTIUS, supra note 131, at 193.
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There is no fundamental clash between justice and morality in the Grotian
approach, but it does recognize the clash between the prima facie interests of
the owner and those of the party facing necessity. It represents this clash not
as a conflict between rights of property and some other moral value, but as a
conflict between competing but commensurable "pre-property" interests. The
conflict between the owner and the agent in need is resolved within the
institution of property by consulting the institution's fundamental justification.
Moral weight is given to both interests: one party's need yields a temporary
right to use, without express permission, the property of another, but
compensation for the use is still required.
Coleman might object to this approach on the ground that it puts necessity
cases beyond the pale of corrective justice. But we are forced to this
conclusion only if we accept Coleman's assumption that the core of corrective
justice is concerned only with redressing wrongful losses. If we adopt the view
that corrective justice is concerned with the fair allocation of losses produced
by causal interaction between individuals, then necessity cases still fall within
the ambit of corrective justice. If my proposal for dealing with necessity cases
is the more plausible one, we have reason to reconsider Coleman's thesis that
the domain of corrective justice is defined by wrongful loss.
4. Injurers, Victims, and Strict Liability
Any conception of corrective justice that places fault at its center faces the
problem of explaining the strict liability elements of modem tort practice.
Coleman's response to these elements is complex. First, Coleman argues that
some cases fall beyond the pale of corrective justice and are best explained on
"market" rather than "moral" principles. He treats products liability law in this
manner.' He also treats what he calls "strict victim liability" in this way,
claiming that corrective justice is silent where there is no wrongful loss.'36
Second, Coleman treats the more standard kinds of strict liability as falling
within the core of corrective justice and requiring a finding of fault. He divides
these cases into two camps: those, like Rylands v. . Fletcher3 7 and
ultrahazardous activities cases,'38 which involve inherent negligence;3 9 and
the remainder, which he treats much as he did the necessity cases, as involving
infringements which give rise to rights to repair despite being justified.'
40
135. RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 4, at 407-29.
136. Id. at 227-33. With "strict victim liability" Coleman refers to the fact that, under a fault liability
system, the victim is liable for all losses suffered as a result of the causal interaction between injurer and
victim unless the victim can prove fault on the part of the injurer.
137. Rylands v. Fletcher, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Exch. 1865).
138. E.g., Spano v. Perini Corp., 250 N.E.2d 31 (N.Y. 1969).
139. RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 4, at 367-69. This is negligence "not in the manner of doing,
but in the very doing itself." Id. at 369.
140. Id. at 371-72. Coleman doesn't make clear which cases he thinks can best be explained in these
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Coleman's manner of dealing with strict liability gives us further reason
to question his view that wrongful loss defines the scope of corrective justice.
Let us accept that products liability is different, and plausibly treated on some
basis other than corrective justice, and focus on the other three forms of strict
liability. First, if my alternative analysis of necessity cases is preferred to
Coleman's, then he is forced to treat these cases as falling beyond the pale of
corrective justice or, as I argue, face further pressure to modify his view of the
centrality of fault to corrective justice. Second, Coleman's treatment of strict
victim liability is not entirely satisfying. If strict victim liability is an inevitable
consequence of a fault system of tort liability, and if corrective justice is silent
where there is no fault, then this inevitable part of the core of tort practice is
left unexplained and unjustified. Coleman may be able to extend market
principles to account for this large part of tort practice, but he does not offer
such an argument. At this point, Coleman's restriction of corrective justice to
imposing duties for wrongful losses on those responsible for them seems
arbitrary. In such cases, the question of how the losses ought to be allocated
requires a principled answer. It would be a mistake, I think, to see strict victim
liability cases as analogous to cases in which fellow citizens suffer losses as
the result of a natural disaster. Finally, Coleman's treatment of Rylands as
involving inherent negligence strains credibility, and the credibility it has turns
on the plausibility of Coleman's notion of fault in the action.
B. Fault in the Action and Fair Allocation of Losses
There may still be a reason for Coleman to insist on the centrality of fault
in corrective justice if he believes there is a morally important difference
between principles of liability in the law of negligence and intentional torts,
and the principles animating strict liability and necessity, and that the
difference lies in the notion of fault. This thought would be compelling if he
could argue that the basic justification for imposing tort liability is moral
culpability, but Coleman clearly and correctly rejects any such "retributive"
account of corrective justice. 4 ' One of his reasons for doing so is that the
standards of wrongful action in corrective justice and for liability in torts are
objective; they do not recognize culpability-defeating excuses.
Nevertheless, Coleman argues that the notion of fault in the action operates
both in corrective justice and in torts. I am not convinced this is an intelligible
concept. Insofar as there is a notion of fault at work, it is a notion of fault in
the agent, and thus one of culpability. I doubt we can make sense of fault in
an action if it is not based on fault in the agent. My argument is simple: there
are no actions without agents, and thus we speak of faulty actions only
terms.
141. Id. at 220-24, 234-36.
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derivatively. Actions may be good or bad, right or wrong, justified or
unjustified, but only agents bear responsibility for them and they alone are
bearers of fault. Coleman suggests that an action can be faulty by virtue of
violating some standard. Strictly speaking, however, actions do not violate
standards, they only conform or fail to conform to them. Agents violate
standards.
We must not confuse the questionable distinction between fault in the
agent and fault in the action with the legitimate and important distinction
between an agent's having a fault and an agent's being at fault. 42 A person
may be at fault in certain circumstances but have no defect of character; the
action may have been "out of character." This is a very important distinction,
but it is not Coleman's distinction. While the action may have been out of
character, and all would agree that the agent has no defect of character, the
agent may still be blameworthy. The ordinary notion of culpability applies.
According to Coleman's distinction, however, no one is to blame if there is no
fault in the agent.
With the notion of fault in the action, Coleman has isolated an important
moral idea, but he has not articulated it adequately. The idea, I think, is that
in those cases in which someone injures another in violation of an "objective"
standard of liability, we think it fair that the agent bear some or all of the
resulting losses. This suggests that fairness in the allocation of such losses does
not depend on a noncomparative assessment of desert, because the injurer may
not deserve to bear the losses any more than the victim does. Instead, it
suggests that the fair allocation of such losses depends on a comparative
assessment of the parties' respective contributions to the creation of the losses.
If this idea is correct, it suggests that the noncomparative conceptual structure
of the notion of fault may distort the moral intuition at work.
If something like the theory articulated above helps explain our willingness
to adopt an "objective" standard of liability, then there may be a notion of fair
assumption or allocation of losses that unifies negligence, necessity, and strict
liability. To explore this suggestion we do not have to abandon Coleman's
conception of corrective justice-indeed, we could not begin the inquiry
without the basic structure of his conception-but we do need to resist for the
time being his thesis that the ambit of corrective justice is defined by wrongful
losses and the notion of fault. Ultimately, we may find that the best account
of the principles of fair allocation or assumption of losses gives a large role
to fault. However, any such account must also make way for principles at
work in the core of tort practice that are not plausibly reduced to dimensions
of fault liability.
What exactly are these principles? Do they have a coherent moral focus?
How do they relate to principles of distributive justice? Are they rationally
142. See JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 188-94 (1970).
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defensible? These are the large and important questions we must now address.
The great value of Coleman's work is that it, more than any previous work in
the field, enables us to see clearly the importance of these questions and
provides us with the conceptual equipment we need to answer them.

